Will you fly on a Boeing 737 Max 8?

[lifesavacation]

There's increased speculation about the pilots not knowing how to disable the flight control system with the sensor malfunctioning.

Also, the training the pilots received for the 737 MAX was a 2 hours long training on iPad(!), since the design was considered an upgrade, not redesign.

An off-duty pilot saved 737 MAX 8

I read that yesterday. What a sad fact to know a different pilot could have saved those lives by simply disengaging the auto pilot.

 

[nd5056]

There's quite interesting Podcast just a bit down on this page to listen to, titled:

"Listen to ‘The Daily’: Two Crashes, a Single Jet: The Story of Boeing’s 737 Max"

edit: It explains the new engines and software on this plane.

 

[DLgal]

Too bad the original flight manual didn't mention the MCAS system. Also too bad Boeing didn't feel the need to tell the airlines or the pilots that this system was added to this model plane, because they wanted to be able to sell it without requiring additional pilot training, because that would cut into the number of orders they would receive and they wouldn't make as much money. It's really too bad. It's also too bad that Boeing designed a sensor so prone to malfunctioning and didn't create a redundancy in the program to require both sensors to have the same reading before engaging the system, to account for one sensor malfunctioning. It's too bad that Boeing wanted to simultaneously market this plane as one that pilots without too much experience could easily fly, to increase their potential customer base, while at the same time designing a system that requires extensive pilot experience to know how to handle when the system goes rogue.

It really is too bad.

Someone at Boeing will probably end up in jail after all is said and done.

 

[kdonnel]

Too bad the original flight manual didn't mention the MCAS system. Also too bad Boeing didn't feel the need to tell the airlines or the pilots that this system was added to this model plane, because they wanted to be able to sell it without requiring additional pilot training, because that would cut into the number of orders they would receive and they wouldn't make as much money. It's really too bad. It's also too bad that Boeing designed a sensor so prone to malfunctioning and didn't create a redundancy in the program to require both sensors to have the same reading before engaging the system, to account for one sensor malfunctioning. It's too bad that Boeing wanted to simultaneously market this plane as one that pilots without too much experience could easily fly, to increase their potential customer base, while at the same time designing a system that requires extensive pilot experience to know how to handle when the system goes rogue.

It really is too bad.

Someone at Boeing will probably end up in jail after all is said and done.

The switch that needed to be flipped to save the plane has been part of the 737 since 1965. It has been part of the emergency checklist since 1965. This is not Boeings fault.

This is extreme negligence on the part of Lion Air and Ethiopian Air.

 

[nd5056]

The switch that needed to be flipped to save the plane has been part of the 737 since 1965. It has been part of the emergency checklist since 1965. This is not Boeings fault.

This is extreme negligence on the part of Lion Air and Ethiopian Air.

It's great to have one with deep knowledge to chime in. And who'd be better then experienced professional pilot. I was wondering if you could express your opinion on this quoted text below. As more and more details come out some things are just mind bugling to me. Why the pilots, even when inexperienced or under trained, couldn't find a solution, AKA the switch, inside the emergency manual? I'm sure the emergency manual has to be fairly short and specific. Also, how hove they were not aware of the fact they're loosing the altitude? 9 minutes its a fraction or a very long time, depending on point of view.

...Flight data shows the on-board computers were pushing the plane’s nose down. Then the pilots aimed the nose higher. That happened 26 times, with the crew never following procedures to correct the problem...

...
The captain was at the controls of Lion Air flight JT610 when the nearly new jet took off from Jakarta, and the first officer was handling the radio, according to a preliminary report issued in November.

Just two minutes into the flight, the first officer reported a “flight control problem” to air traffic control and said the pilots intended to maintain an altitude of 5,000 feet, the November report said.

The first officer did not specify the problem, but one source said airspeed was mentioned on the cockpit voice recording, and a second source said an indicator showed a problem on the captain’s display but not the first officer’s.

The captain asked the first officer to check the quick reference handbook, which contains checklists for abnormal events, the first source said.

For the next nine minutes, the jet warned pilots it was in a stall and pushed the nose down in response, the report showed. A stall is when the airflow over a plane’s wings is too weak to generate lift and keep it flying.

The captain fought to climb, but the computer, still incorrectly sensing a stall, continued to push the nose down using the plane’s trim system. Normally, trim adjusts an aircraft’s control surfaces to ensure it flies straight and level.

“They didn’t seem to know the trim was moving down,” the third source said. “They thought only about airspeed and altitude. That was the only thing they talked about.”
...

 

[lifesavacation]

It's great to have one with deep knowledge to chime in. And who'd be better then experienced professional pilot. I was wondering if you could express your opinion on this quoted text below. As more and more details come out some things are just mind bugling to me. Why the pilots, even when inexperienced or under trained, couldn't find a solution, AKA the switch, inside the emergency manual? I'm sure the emergency manual has to be fairly short and specific. Also, how hove they were not aware of the fact they're loosing the altitude? 9 minutes its a fraction or a very long time, depending on point of view.

I can only repeat what has been reported, but I did read that after the Lion Air crash, Boeing required an hour training on how to address whatever happened. Both the pilots of the Ethiopian Air had just completed the required training. If it was as simple as flipping a switch, it should have been fresh in their minds.

 

[DLgal]

The switch that needed to be flipped to save the plane has been part of the 737 since 1965. It has been part of the emergency checklist since 1965. This is not Boeings fault.

This is extreme negligence on the part of Lion Air and Ethiopian Air.

Have you even read any of the articles about this? It's not just a switch to flip. There is a series of steps (allegedly) that need to be taken, in a specific order. Numerous articles and pilot interviews have said as much. Even the experienced domestic airline pilots have mentioned that they were unaware that this system was even installed before the Lion Air crash and they wouldn't have necessarily known what to do if faced with a similar situation because they would not be expecting the plane to behave that way. Apparently, this malfunctioning system was NOT responding to pilot control input. One pilot interviewed said that ANY system that takes over flight controls should be 100% disclosed to the pilot ahead of time and the steps to shut it down should be stated EXPLICITLY in the flight manual, which it was not.

It would be like buying a car with an auto drive feature installed that you don't know is there and all of a sudden, at freeway speed, your car starts veering wildly and your efforts to control the wheel make no difference at all. If you don't know the system exists, how are you supposed to know how to turn it off?

 

[kdonnel]

Have you even read any of the articles about this? It's not just a switch to flip. There is a series of steps (allegedly) that need to be taken, in a specific order. Numerous articles and pilot interviews have said as much. Even the experienced domestic airline pilots have mentioned that they were unaware that this system was even installed before the Lion Air crash and they wouldn't have necessarily known what to do if faced with a similar situation because they would not be expecting the plane to behave that way. Apparently, this malfunctioning system was NOT responding to pilot control input. One pilot interviewed said that ANY system that takes over flight controls should be 100% disclosed to the pilot ahead of time and the steps to shut it down should be stated EXPLICITLY in the flight manual, which it was not.

It would be like buying a car with an auto drive feature installed that you don't know is there and all of a sudden, at freeway speed, your car starts veering wildly and your efforts to control the wheel make no difference at all. If you don't know the system exists, how are you supposed to know how to turn it off?

https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-u-s-airlines-decisions-to-keep-flying-the-737-max-11553092416

If the MCAS system malfunctions, pilots say the prescribed fix is to use manual trim to stabilize the plane, and then disconnect the trim system. There’s a cutoff switch on the center pedestal of the 737, not far from throttles, marked “Stab Trim.” Pilots routinely train to disconnect the automatic trim in the case of runaway trim with autopilot use.

The same steps pilots of the 737 have used since 1965 are used to recover from the MCAS misbehaving.

This is pilot error.


People are trying to blame the evil faceless corporation when they are not to blame.

Sensors fail, automation fails. Pilots should know how to handle failures. These four pilots failed.

 

[kdonnel]

This is not the first crash of a plane due to pilots relying too much on automation.

Asiana Airlines 214 crashed in San Francisco because the pilots relied too much on the automation and were totally unaware of the situation.

Pilots need to be trained on what to do when the automation fails. That is NOT something Boeing or Airbus is responsible to make sure happens. That is the responsibility of the airlines. Lion Air and Ethiopian Air and Asiana Airlines are recent examples of airlines that seem to have forgotten that pilots need to know how to fly planes when the automation fails.

 

[mnrose]

https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-u-s-airlines-decisions-to-keep-flying-the-737-max-11553092416


The same steps pilots of the 737 have used since 1965 are used to recover from the MCAS misbehaving.

This is pilot error.


People are trying to blame the evil faceless corporation when they are not to blame.

Sensors fail, automation fails. Pilots should know how to handle failures. These four pilots failed.

Wow. You could save everyone a lot of time and trouble by reporting your conclusions, which apparently have not been reached by the actual investigators doing the work. Phew. Now we all know.

Maybe the manuals were deficient (being looked at). Maybe there's a problem with the MCAS system (being looked at). But, there's a more basis point. Even if we ASSUME (which is all we are doing right now) that the pilots MIGHT have been able to save the plane had they known the correct procedures, the reality is that the plane should not do what those planes did. That needs to be looked at too....why was there a condition created that the pilots needed to 'save' the plane from? Isn't that a question? And, the plane doing it apparently quite often (three cases that we know about for certain). This doesn't seem "normal."

 

[DLgal]

Wow. You could save everyone a lot of time and trouble by reporting your conclusions, which apparently have not been reached by the actual investigators doing the work. Phew. Now we all know.

Maybe the manuals were deficient (being looked at). Maybe there's a problem with the MCAS system (being looked at). But, there's a more basis point. Even if we ASSUME (which is all we are doing right now) that the pilots MIGHT have been able to save the plane had they known the correct procedures, the reality is that the plane should not do what those planes did. That needs to be looked at too....why was there a condition created that the pilots needed to 'save' the plane from? Isn't that a question? And, the plane doing it apparently quite often (three cases that we know about for certain). This doesn't seem "normal."

Exactly. This points to negligence on the part of Boeing.

I don't know why anyone is trying to protect them, if not because of $$$. It seems that both Boeing and the FAA are potentially at fault here, for creating a situation where the company was basically allowed to "self certify" this aircraft. The truth is, Boeing installed a new system on an existing plane TYPE, but did not tell pilots about it until AFTER the first crash. Seems that is the textbook definition of negligence to me. Those aren't just my words either. A fair number of people who hold more information, power and esteem than I ever will are saying the same thing, and investigations are being launched by several entities. It has already been said numerous times that the MCAS system apparently malfunctioned on these planes that crashed. Meaning, it activated when it should not have, under the wrong circumstances, at a time when a plane does not have enough altitude, and thus, VERY little time (seconds) to fix the situation, and potentially DID NOT RESPOND as it should have when pilots attempted to correct the problem.

Now, I will say, Lion Air shares fault with putting that plane back into service when it had already had one instance of this system incorrectly engaging on a flight the day before. That plane should NOT have gone in the air the following day until that malfunctioning sensor was fixed. I have seen mixed reports on whether that was done or not.

 

[nd5056]

This is not the first crash of a plane due to pilots relying too much on automation.

...

Pilots need to be trained on what to do when the automation fails.

...

Very true. But, I just learned that this is not a "NEW" problem with those sensors. Shouldn't learning about it be part of the commercial pilot basic training? So, shouldn't the pilots be well aware on how to react when such a situation develops? It may be the pilot's fault, but I'm sure it's every's airline best interest not to crash any planes. Therefore, wouldn't the airline train their pilots to the best of their ability?

Sensor cited as potential factor in Boeing crashes draws scrutiny


In 2014, Lufthansa Flight 1829 took off from Bilbao, Spain, and was ascending normally when the plane’s nose unexpectedly dropped. The plane — an Airbus A321 with 109 passengers on board — began to fall. The co-pilot tried to raise the nose with his controls. The plane pointed down even further. He tried again. Nothing, according to a report by German investigators.

As the Lufthansa plane fell from 31,000 feet, the captain pulled back on his stick as hard as he could. The nose finally responded. But he struggled to hold the plane level.

A call to a ground crew determined the plane’s angle-of-attack sensors — which detect whether the wings have enough lift to keep flying — must have been malfunctioning, causing the Airbus’s anti-stall software to force the plane’s nose down. The pilots turned off the problematic unit and continued the flight. Aviation authorities in Europe and the United States eventually ordered the replacement of angle-of-attack sensors on many Airbus models.

Today, aviation experts say that the angle-of-attack sensor on Boeing jets will get fresh scrutiny after two Boeing 737 Max airplanes crashed, in Ethiopia last week and in Indonesia in October.

Accident investigators have raised concerns about the role of the sensor — a device used on virtually every commercial flight — in the October crash of Lion Air Flight 610. There are concerns it may have sent the wrong signals to new software on the flight that automatically dips the plane’s nose to prevent a stall.

It is not clear whether the angle-of-attack sensor played a role in the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. Boeing chief executive Dennis Muilenburg said Sunday that his company is finalizing software updates and pilot training protocols to address problems that have emerged “in response to erroneous sensor inputs.” He did not specify which sensors.


Muilenberg’s comments followed a statement by Ethiopia’s transportation secretary earlier Sunday that the plane’s black boxes showed “clear similarities” between the Indonesian and Ethiopian crashes. Aviation authorities worldwide grounded the Boeing 737 Max last week out of concern about the plane’s safety.

In interviews late last week, aviation experts said there was no reason for broad alarm about the sensors. But six experts said that the risks posed by a faulty angle-of-attack sensor are amplified by the increasing role of cockpit automation. It is an example of how the same technology that makes aircraft safer — automated software — can be undone by a seemingly small problem.

“The sensor going out is serious,” said Clint Balog, a test pilot and associate professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. “But it can be made critical by software.”

Most commercial pilots today know how to respond to a malfunctioning sensor, said Shem Malmquist, a Boeing 777 captain and a visiting professor at the Florida Institute of Technology.

But potential complications arise with how software interprets what the sensor tells it.

“When you introduce computer controls, you start to get interactions that are hard to anticipate,” Malmquist said.

Angle-of-attack sensors have been flagged as problems more than 50 times on U.S. commercial airplanes over the past five years, although no accidents have occurred over millions of miles flown, according to reports made to the Federal Aviation Administration’s Service Difficulty Reporting database. That makes it a relatively unusual problem, aviation experts said — but also one with magnified importance because of its prominent role in flight software.

“It is notable,” said David Soucie, a former FAA maintenance safety inspector.

The sensor is especially helpful for nighttime flying, Soucie said, but its loss alone should not create problems that pilots are unable to handle.

The FAA reports include 19 reported cases of sensor trouble on Boeing aircraft, such as an American Airlines flight last year that declared a midflight emergency when the plane’s stall-warning system went off, despite normal airspeed. The Boeing 737-800 landed safely. Maintenance crews replaced three parts, including the angle-of-attack sensor, according to the FAA database.

In 2017, an American Airlines-operated Boeing 767 headed to Zurich declared an emergency and returned to New York. Another angle-of-attack sensor was replaced. And an American Airlines 767 was forced to return to Miami in 2014 after a midflight emergency because of a faulty angle-of-attack sensor.

A Boeing spokesman declined to comment for this report. The FAA did not respond to a request for comment.

The angle-of-attack sensors on the fatal Lion Air flight were made by Minnesota-based Rosemount Aerospace, according to a photograph of the part that was shown by Indonesian officials to reporters after the recovery of the wreckage. It is a model commonly used on commercial aircraft.

A spokeswoman for Rosemount’s parent company, United Technologies, declined to comment.

The angle-of-attack sensor measures the amount of lift generated by the wings. The name refers to the angle between the wing and oncoming air. Its main purpose is to warn pilots when the plane could stall from too little lift, leading to a loss of control.

Many of the sensors include a small vane attached to the outside of a commercial aircraft. Most planes have two or three vanes as part of a redundant system. But they are not complicated machines. The Wright brothers used a version on their first flight.

Placing too much trust in the sensors also can cause trouble. One of the most serious accidents tied to angle-of-attack sensors occurred in 2008, when XL Airways Germany Flight 888T crashed into the Mediterranean Sea, killing seven people. French authorities blamed water-soaked angle-of-attack sensors on the Airbus 320 plane, saying they generated inaccurate readings and set up a chain of events that resulted in a stall.

According to investigators, the downed airplane’s sensors were made by Rosemount, the same company that made the sensors on the Lion Air crash. At the time, Rosemount was also called Goodrich, the company that owned the aerospace manufacturer at the time.

In the Lion Air crash, pilots struggled for control with the 737 Max’s automated flight controls — the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS. Faulty readings from the angle-of-attack sensors may have led the MCAS to believe the aircraft was in danger of stalling just as it was taking off from Indonesia, according to the preliminary report by Indonesian investigators. Gaining speed by diving can prevent a stall.

After the crash, the FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive in November for 737 Max 8 and 9 models that warned a mistakenly high reading from one angle-of-attack sensor “could cause the flight crew to have difficulty controlling the airplane.”

Less is known about the Ethiopian Airlines crash. But it involves the same type of aircraft and crashed at a similar point in its flight path as the Lion Air plane, according to investigators.

Both planes were equipped with the MCAS, which uses angle-of-attack sensors to determine whether a plane is nearing a stall.

Airbus equips many of its commercial jets with its own anti-stall software that relies on an automated process.

During the Lufthansa flight in 2014, faulty information from the angle-of-attack sensors triggered the software, pushing the plane’s nose down, according to German aviation investigators. The program thought the plane was nearing a stall. The captain was eventually able to override the automated system, and the pilots, after talking with a maintenance crew, identified the likely problem and continued the flight to Munich.

Investigators later found that two of the angle-of-attack sensors were blocked, probably by frozen water, and generated improper readings.

European authorities and the FAA issued airworthiness directives over several years aimed at addressing sensor problems on Airbuses.

Airbus A320 planes with certain sensors made by two companies — United Technologies, parent company of Rosemount, which makes Boeing sensors; and Sextant/Thomson — “appear to have a greater susceptibility to adverse environmental conditions” than sensors made by a third company, the FAA said.

One important difference between the Lufthansa incident and the two 737 Max accidents, aviation experts said, was where they occurred.

The Lufthansa plane was soaring at 31,000 feet when it launched into a steep dive. It dropped 4,000 feet in less than a minute before the pilots wrestled back control.

If the sensor problem had hit soon after departure, as investigators suspect it did with the Lion Air crash, that incident could have ended in disaster.

 

[kdonnel]

Very true. But, I just learned that this is not a "NEW" problem with those sensors. Shouldn't learning about it be part of the commercial pilot basic training? So, shouldn't the pilots be well aware on how to react when such a situation develops? It may be the pilot's fault, but I'm sure it's every's airline best interest not to crash any planes. Therefore, wouldn't the airline train their pilots to the best of their ability?

Cost.

American, Air Canada, and SouthWest appear to have trained their pilots.

 

[kdonnel]

Wow. You could save everyone a lot of time and trouble by reporting your conclusions, which apparently have not been reached by the actual investigators doing the work. Phew. Now we all know.

Maybe the manuals were deficient (being looked at). Maybe there's a problem with the MCAS system (being looked at). But, there's a more basis point. Even if we ASSUME (which is all we are doing right now) that the pilots MIGHT have been able to save the plane had they known the correct procedures, the reality is that the plane should not do what those planes did. That needs to be looked at too....why was there a condition created that the pilots needed to 'save' the plane from? Isn't that a question? And, the plane doing it apparently quite often (three cases that we know about for certain). This doesn't seem "normal."

There will be contributing factors listed, but the main factor will be pilot error. No one had to die, if the pilots had just followed a 54 year old procedure for how to handle a 737 behaving in that manner, as evidenced by the Lion Air flight that did not crash when the jump seat pilot saved the day.

 

[nd5056]

Here's one more, published 1 hour ago:

Confusion, Then Prayer, in Cockpit of Doomed Lion Air Jet

JAKARTA, Indonesia — As the seconds ticked by on the doomed Indonesian flight, the pilot handed the controls to his co-pilot and flipped through the pages of a technical manual, trying to figure out what was happening.

Then, as the nose of Lion Air Flight 610 repeatedly bucked downward, Harvino, the co-pilot, began to pray.

The supplication was caught on the final seconds of audio in the cockpit voice recorder.

“God is great,” Mr. Harvino, an experienced Indonesian aviator, said, then recited a verse asking God to grant a miracle.

But there was no miracle on Oct. 29, when the brand-new Boeing 737 Max 8 dived into the Java Sea in Indonesia, amid good weather, after 12 minutes in the air.

Until that point, he said, the pilots had sounded in control and calm.

With the crash of a second nearly brand-new Boeing 737 Max 8 earlier this month, when Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 slammed into the ground near the capital, Addis Ababa, there has been a renewed focus on the investigation into what caused Flight 610 to crash in Indonesia, killing all 189 people on board.

Indonesian transportation officials say they do not expect to publish a final report on the accident until July or August at the earliest. A preliminary report, based on the contents of the flight data recorder — one of the two so-called black boxes that give investigators clues to what happened in aviation accidents — was released in November.

The cockpit voice recorder was not found until after the preliminary report was released, so the conversations between Bhavye Suneja, an Indian national who was piloting the plane, and Mr. Harvino were not included in the initial investigative account.

The report noted that the plane’s nose suddenly shifted downward more than 20 times, a motion that investigators think may have been caused by the incorrect triggering of a new automated anti-stall system on the Boeing Max model.

Since the Lion Air crash, pilots certified to fly the Max have complained that they were not briefed on the new system or on how to counter it should incorrect data force the nose down.

Indonesian aviation regulations prohibit a transcript of the cockpit voice recorder from being made public. But investigators from the National Transportation Safety Committee who listened to the recording described the sounds emanating from the cockpit as the flight crew fought to take control of a plane that seemed almost magnetically propelled toward earth.

Throughout the brief flight, an ominous rattle could be heard on the voice recorder, evidence that a device called a stick shaker was clattering to alert the pilots of a potential stall that could lead to a crash, said Ony Soerjo Wibowo, an air safety investigator. A stall can occur when a plane ascends too sharply.

But investigators have speculated that incorrect data — including a 20-degree differential between two sensors designed to measure, essentially, the difference between the pitch of the plane and direction it is moving through the air — could have mistakenly triggered both the stick shaker and the anti-stall system, which is called MCAS.

The plane had recorded days of questionable data related to air speed, altitude and the angle of the plane’s climb.

In the first sign of trouble on Oct. 29, the plane dipped around 700 feet, and in the subsequent minutes, MCAS appears to have kept dragging the plane’s nose down, prompting the pilots to try to push the plane back up by using switches that control stabilizers on the tail.

The flight crew radioed back to the air traffic control tower in Jakarta, the Indonesian capital, to request permission to return to the airport, which was granted. The pilot also asked for the plane to be given a 3,000-foot clearance above and below as it continued to roller coaster through the air.

Flight 610 never turned back to the airport.

In the cockpit voice recording, the pilots discussed unreliable airspeed and altitude readings they were getting, national transportation safety officials said.

They consulted the manual to deal with these anomalies. But they did not seem to know about the MCAS system, nor did they speak about what was causing the plane to repeatedly push downward.

Shortly after Mr. Harvino’s prayer, the plane disappeared from radar, and the cockpit voice recorder stopped. The plane plummeted 5,000 feet, crashing into the Java Sea with such force that parts of the fuselage turned into powder.

Mr. Harvino’s remains are missing to this day.


James Glanz contributed reporting from New York.

 

[wilbret]

Yes, I would fly a 737 Max. I also agree that someone will get fired or go to jail for this, to appease the masses.
To add to that, I would never fly on any airline based out of Ethiopia or Indonesia.

 

[jalapeno_pretzel]

No. The similar crashes are just too coincidental for my taste.

We are flying to Paris on Norwegian in the summer. Before the airline announced they were pulling the planes from service, I checked to see if we were on one (we weren’t). I’m not sure what I would have initially done if we were.

They may be back in service by summer, it sounds like they're going to roll out this software change fairly quickly.

 

[monsterkitty]

Sully has a bit to say about Boeing and the FAA: https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/sully-blasts-boeing-and-faa-as-too-cozy/ar-BBV1LEP?ocid=spartandhp

 

[nd5056]

Sully has a bit to say about Boeing and the FAA: https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/sully-blasts-boeing-and-faa-as-too-cozy/ar-BBV1LEP?ocid=spartandhp

The Podcast I mentioned earlier, they talked about how and why this relationship is happening. It's a great Podcast to listen to.

Anyway, I understand that FBI raided the Chicago based Boeing offices yesterday as they started to investigate how the MAX plane got certified.

 

[nd5056]

They may be back in service by summer, it sounds like they're going to roll out this software change fairly quickly.

I think they'll be back in service next month. It costs the Airlines and Boeing as well too much money for them to sit on the ground. And there are no replacements widely available to charter. Unless the investigation reveals something ugly. We may possibly see the crash investigation preliminary report perhaps as soon as next week.